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The vote by the British people to leave the European Union has confronted both the 
UK and the EU with an unprecedented challenge. For the UK, the decision means the 
Conservative government led by new prime minister Theresa May faces a period of 
difficult choices over the unity of the UK, its political economy, and place in the world. 
Such is the scale of those choices and the potential for them to turn out wrong for the 
UK that the FT’s Philip Stephen’s (2016) declared the vote had left Britain ‘a nation 
surrendering its claim to be one of the world’s most stable democracies.’ The EU itself 
risks coming out little better. It is now faced with the prospect of agreeing a divorce with 
one of its largest member states. This comes at a time when the EU continues to struggle 
with Eurozone problems, the migration crisis, Russian revanchism, and the election of a 
hawkish US president. It is hardly surprising then that Brexit has added to talk of 
European disintegration (Oliver, 2016). The effects of Brexit are not confined to the UK 
and the rest of Europe. The vote has fed into debates about the rise of such figures as 
Donald Trump, the politics of ‘left behind’ voters, of managing the effects of 
globalisation, and the future of the transatlantic relationship in an emerging multipolar 
world.  
 
Brexit is not an event but a process, and one that could take a prolonged period of time 
and involve decisions and votes in various political arenas in both the UK and elsewhere 
in the EU. The actors involved face numerous possibilities as they move forward. Those 
actors range from individual EU leaders through to millions of voters in the UK and 
other EU member states. The story of Brexit could end up being written in any number 
of ways. This article outlines the various challenges that Brexit now poses in British, EU, 
European and international politics. It does so by mapping out the negotiations and 
debates that will now unfold. This process has many potential flashpoints that could 
cause delay, division and animosity. They could also create opportunities for the UK, EU 
and international partners. It has long been apparent that Brexit would be one of the 
biggest political, constitutional, administrative, diplomatic, economic, social, security and 
cultural challenges to face the contemporary UK. As this article shows, finding a way 
through this minefield will be no easy task for leaders in the UK, the EU or elsewhere.  
 
UK – Brexit Narrative 
 
When in 2013 David Cameron committed the Conservative party to holding a 
referendum on the UK’s EU membership he announced that, ‘it is time to settle this 
European question in British politics.’ Despite a wide-ranging speech, Cameron failed to 
articulate what that question was. That is in no small part because the issue of Europe in 
UK politics reaches deep, often becoming a proxy for a host of matters (Glencross, 
2015; Oliver, 2015). In the scramble to shape the post-vote political debate, defining 
what the British people voted for will shape what positions the UK government takes in 
negotiations. This will not be easy because the referendum became a proxy for a host of 
other matters (Beauchamp, 2016). A short sample of what drove fifty two per cent of 
British voters to back leave would include concerns about democracy, a desire to assert 
British sovereignty, the failure of young people to vote in large enough numbers, people 
worrying more about immigration than economics, nationalism and especially English 
nationalism, anti-elitism, anti-London, hostility to the outside world, a desire to embrace 
a more global as opposed to European worldview, and the EU’s own failings. The key 
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debates have been over immigration, sovereignty and economics (Goodwin, 2016). The 
emerging narrative is also shaping how the world interprets and responds to Brexit. The 
vote was one of the most anticipated signposts on the direction of international relations 
(Fordham and Techau, 2016). Whether the vote confirms a move towards isolationism, 
nationalism and populism will be confirmed or rejected in how well, to take the most 
prominent examples, Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen do in the US and French 
elections.  
 
UK – Party politics 
 
Negotiations and a leadership race might have now concluded over the leadership of the 
Conservative party and therefore of HM Government, but the leadership of other parties 
remains in flux. Theresa May’s appointment as Prime Minister has left a reluctant remain 
campaigner leading a Conservative party where tensions over Europe remain clear 
(Shipman and Pancevski, 2016). May’s appointment thanks to Andrea Leadsom’s 
withdrawal from the leadership race might have avoided a potential party split (Boffey 
and Helm, 2016). A reminder that difficult choices over Brexit may yet still expose 
divisions. Her appointment of prominent Eurosceptics such as Liam Fox, David Davis 
and Boris Johnson to senior EU and international positions demonstrated the strength 
of that side of the party. Tensions over UK-EU relations will continue to shape how the 
party – with a slim governing majority of twelve – defines and enacts Brexit. The Labour 
party, meanwhile, has also found itself facing a potential split in part because of the 
fallout from the referendum and Jeremy Corbyn’s lacklustre efforts during the campaign 
(Boffey and Helm, 2016). The uncertainty facing Labour reduces the pressure on the 
Conservative party, potentially emboldening Eurosceptic ministers. UKIP too is in flux, 
with Nigel Farage’s resignation depriving it of the man who defined the party. Despite its 
strong connection with the European issue, support for the party has not been driven by 
Europe alone. Instead it has capitalised on a range of opportunities, including different 
attitudes towards immigration between the Labour party and large numbers of traditional 
labour supporters (Goodwin, 2015). UKIP could remain an effective political force, 
casting a shadow over both the Conservative and Labour parties as they face the 
challenges of Brexit. That shadow will likely be seen in by-elections, where the pro-
European Liberal Democrats may also see a comeback; a reminder that forty-eight per 
cent of voters backed remain (Rankin, 2016). The idea of either party making headway in 
an early general election faces the problem of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. 
Unless somehow repealed, or a deal done with the opposition parties to dissolve 
parliament early, the next general election will not be until May 2020 (Strong, 2016). 
 
UK – Parliament and the people 
 
The close result of the referendum led to calls for a re-run of the vote, including a 
petition that attracted 4 million signatures. Whether another referendum happens 
depends on the UK government calling one, or the House of Commons overcoming 
government opposition by voting one into law. In addition to calls for a re-run there 
have been calls for the British people to be given a vote over any new post-withdrawal 
relationship the UK agrees with the EU (Oliver, 2016a). This would be one way in which 
the meaning of Brexit could be defined and approved. Again, this would require 
government to back such a vote or the Commons to vote for one. It is more likely that 
the House of Commons will vote into law whatever new deal is reached with the EU, 
but this does not promise to be an easy route for HM Government given the 
Conservative party’s slim majority and tensions within all parties over what Brexit means 
 3 
(Strong, 2016). A majority of MPs campaigned for Britain to remain in the EU. Those 
MPs may vote for a closer relationship to the EU than leading pro-Brexit campaigners 
would like (Cooper, 2016). The debate about the narrative of Brexit will therefore be 
played out most clearly in the House of Commons division lobbies as MPs vote into law 
what Brexit means. This sets up a potential clash between popular sovereignty (the votes 
of the British people) and parliamentary sovereignty (the right of Parliament to do what 
it wants). The Commons could insist on the UK remaining in the European Economic 
Area, but it could not be sure of doing this with popular support and, as noted, could not 
easily call a general election to try and settle the matter. The British government will also 
have to regularly consult parliament during the negotiations. The slim Conservative 
majority, party divisions and the opportunity for other parties to cause trouble means a 
strong possibility of MPs voting to reject some part of a UK-EU negotiation. Into this 
enters the role of the UK’s Supreme Court. It has already been asked to rule on whether 
the UK Government can trigger Article 50 – the EU’s withdrawal clause – without 
consulting parliament (Gower, 2016). Further challenges could be brought by public and 
private individuals or organisations seeking to disrupt or shape Brexit.  
 
UK – a united kingdom?  
 
The referendum exposed political divisions between the component parts of the UK, 
divisions that will require an inclusive process for managing Brexit. One of Theresa 
May’s first visits as Prime Minister was to Edinburgh where she met with Nicola 
Sturgeon, the First Minister of Scotland (BBC News, 2016). 62 per cent of Scottish 
voters opted for the UK to remain in the EU, putting them at odds with the 51.9 per 
cent UK-wide result for leave, and the 53.2 per cent support for leave in England 
(Uberoi, 2016). This presents a constitutional and political problem. Because of the 
transfer of powers entailed in a UK withdrawal form the EU, the permission of the 
Scottish Parliament will be required (known as the Sewell Convention) to repeal the 
European Communities Act 1972 because this would touch on matters that are devolved 
(Douglas-Scott, 2016). While Theresa May has shown a willingness to consult with the 
Scottish government, it is likely that difficulties will arise in the exit negotiations. Sensing 
problems and opportunities ahead, the Scottish Government quickly reached out to 
interested parties within the EU (Peterkin, 2016). Brexit could lead to another Scottish 
independence referendum, with Scotland seeking to remain or rejoin the EU. That would 
open a Pandora’s box of issues such as over Britain’s nuclear weapons, which are based 
in Scotland (Dorman, 2014). A second referendum leading to independence is a 
possibility. It must, however, be noted that the SNP lack a majority in the Scottish 
Parliament to trigger one (although a majority could probably be found) the timeframe 
for such a vote, independence and (re)securing EU membership could very complex, and 
winning a vote could still be difficult given support for independence is still not 
overwhelming. 
 
The focus on Scotland can distract from two other regions where majorities supported 
remaining and where there will be negotiations to manage any Brexit fallout: Northern 
Ireland and London. In both regions the fallout could extend far beyond the UK. With 
Northern Ireland concerns about the stability of the peace process along with the 
potential implications for the Irish republic led the Irish government to publicly oppose 
UK withdrawal (Barrett et al. 2016). Brexit will complicate the UK-Irish common travel 
area, possibly see a hard border as opposed to the open one that exists now. Such a 
border could trigger political and economic uncertainty in Northern Ireland, something 
that alarms the EU, Irish, US, and British governments.  
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London’s vote to remain in the EU came as no surprise to those who know the 
metropolis (Oliver, 2014). London is a global city with a population and economy 
reflecting this. Its demographics reflect a mix of English, British, European and 
international citizens, with ‘White British’ the largest minority. Its economy is the most 
diverse and globalised in Britain. According to the Centre for Cities, London generates 
almost thirty per cent of all UK tax receipts (McGough and Piazza, 2016). This comes 
from only twelve per cent of Britain’s population. In no other similar sized country does 
the capital city dominate as London does the UK. Not all Londoners voted to remain, or 
have gained from London becoming such a global city (London is home to some of 
Britain’s worst poverty and highest levels of inequality). Nevertheless, the referendum 
highlighted London’s unique place in Britain. The Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, has 
sought to protect London’s interests in the Brexit negotiations. In doing so he has also 
outlined proposals for more powers and taxes to be devolved to London (Mayor of 
London, 2016).  
 
London’s differences and demands have not passed unnoticed elsewhere in Britain, and 
especially England, where the leave vote sometimes carried an anti-elite and anti-London 
feeling. The referendum saw English nationalism come to the fore (Barnett, 2016). 
Polling shows that if a Briton identifies themself as English then they are more likely to 
be Eurosceptic. That doesn’t explain all Euroscepticism. The Welsh voted to leave and 
thirty eight per cent of Scots backed leave, a figure expected to be much lower. And, in 
England, the connection between English nationalism and Euroscepticism is not 
automatic. But English nationalism has become the hallmark of angry, disillusioned 
sections of England that feel left behind in the modern world and contemporary Britain. 
When this mixes with unease at immigration, we have a combination that British 
politicians have been loath to go near. Instead they have been more comfortable with 
being ‘British,’ fearing English nationalism is racist, causes tensions with Scotland and is 
an outlook of the working class and football supporters. But the English side of UK 
politics is not something British politics can any longer live in denial of. 
 
UK – Brexit and the world 
 
The referendum result took many around Europe and the world by surprise. There had 
been an underlying assumption in the financial markets, diplomatic community and 
media that the British would opt for the status quo. The Remain campaign had drawn on 
the support – and warnings – of a wide range of international voices from the IMF 
through to President Obama. The dominant message from the rest of the world was 
therefore one of opposition to Brexit and an assumption that should it happen then 
Britain would face painful costs and be headed towards isolationism. That message was 
reinforced by the political, economic and constitutional uncertainty that immediately 
followed the result. The British government now faces the challenge of shaking off a 
narrative of Brexit adding to British decline and disunity. Part of this will depend on 
Britain’s soft power. According to a poll in 2015 (Portland, 2016) Britain was the world’s 
leading soft power. By 2016 Britain had slipped to second place behind the USA. Time 
will tell whether Britain slips further. Whether remaining at the top of soft power 
rankings will be enough to ensure Britain remains an effective player in international 
relations is another matter. 
 
Britain will need to undertake negotiations with non-EU countries such as the USA to 
discuss any changes Brexit will mean for bilateral relations. In the case of the USA this 
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could entail discussion of what a Brexit could mean for NATO (of which more below), 
and the future of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Oliver and 
Williams, 2016). Britain will need to secure full WTO membership as opposed to being a 
member via the EU. Doing so will require Britain to undertake a prolonged task of 
drawing up ‘schedules’ of tariffs, quotas, subsidies and other concessions on market 
access with the WTO (Ruparel, 2016). These will first need to be agreed with the EU, 
with whom the UK will initially try to remain in line. Changes to take into account new 
deals or preferences with other countries around the world would open up the possibility 
of other WTO members objecting, if only to cause mischief for Britain. Britain will also 
need to negotiate deals with the more than fifty countries that have free trade agreements 
with the EU (Dhingra et al. 2016). UK participation in these agreements will more than 
likely lapse when Britain leaves the EU, leaving Britain and the countries in question to 
agree a new arrangement. Having not negotiated a trade deal since it joined the EU, the 
UK Government may find itself in a vulnerable negotiating position, dependent on good 
will and cooperation of others. The biggest partner to begin will be the EU, with whom 
reaching agreement over a new relationship will be a first order priority. Despite hopes 
of striking new deals quickly with emerging powers or long-standing allies, other 
countries may well be weary of dealing with Britain until UK-EU relations are clarified. 
For example, whether Britain will or will not remain in the single market or parts of it. 
For the foreseeable future the focus of British efforts will be on negotiating close 
relations with the EU.  
 
UK-EU: Article 50 and a Brexit transition  
 
Brexit will require at least two deals between Britain and the EU: an exit deal and a deal 
over a new post-withdrawal relationship. Bridging the two may require another deal for a 
transitionary arrangement (Grant, 2016b). The exit deal required under article 50 will 
cover such issues as the future of UK staff in EU institutions and UK financial 
contributions to shared projects. It will also deal with the rights of UK citizens in the EU 
and vice versa. There could be fraught debates about when the cut-off point will be for 
new arrivals into the UK to be eligible for such rights, with concerns about a rush of EU 
citizens moving to the UK before any agreed date (Home Affairs Committee, 2016). The 
prominent place immigration played in the referendum means that as time passes there 
will be mounting pressure to close the UK border to EU citizens. Article 50 provides a 
two-year period for negotiations, extendable by unanimity of all 28 member states. There 
is some pressure from the rest of the EU to see the UK officially leave the EU before 
the 2019 European Parliament elections and before the EU’s new 2020 budget cycle is 
agreed (Grant, 2016b). While the rest of the EU cannot make Britain trigger article 50, 
delaying for too long risks antagonising not only the rest of the EU but also leave 
campaigners in Britain. The article 50 route is one that some British Eurosceptics would 
prefer to avoid, seeing in it a process that strengthens the hand of the EU by putting the 
UK under pressure in terms of timing and securing the agreement of the rest of the EU. 
Unless agreement were reached within two years Britain would find itself leaving the EU 
with no choice but to trade with the EU under the WTO rules (Renwick, 2016).  
 
Reaching agreement over a post-withdrawal relationship will be a separate deal, 
something discussed further below. Article 50 merely covers the deal by which Britain 
withdraws, albeit one that should be undertaken by the EU while ‘taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union’. This has led to speculation that a 
deal over a new relationship can only be negotiated once Britain has left (Miller, 2016). 
Such a scenario would see both Britain and the EU suffer economically because the 
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WTO option is widely considered the least desirable relationship. However, alternatives 
such as a reformed European Economic Area or a free trade deal will take much longer 
to agree than the two year framework of article 50. Both Britain and the EU will need 
some form of transitionary arrangement, perhaps one that sees Britain join the EEA. By 
doing so Britain would remain a member of the single market, uphold EU law, continue 
to allow free movement, and contribute to the EU budget. Whether leave campaigners 
would be satisfied with such an arrangement is another matter. That has led to various 
proposals (Chalmers and Menon 2016; North, 2016) that would see a special 
transitionary deal, perhaps one that limits freedom of movement, the application of EU 
law and budgetary contributions. As discussed below, whether the remaining EU 
members would agree to such an arrangement remains unclear. Some may seek to use 
the negotiations to extract concessions from Britain. Limited time and political patience 
will make for extremely difficult and tense negotiations.  
 
UK-EU: New relationship 
 
Britain and the EU will need to agree a new relationship, whether this is completed 
during the two years allowed by article 50, after a formal UK exit or during a transition 
period. The EU is notorious for presenting offers with little room for compromise 
because the offer is itself a compromise worked out between twenty eight member states 
– with attention also paid to the opinions of the European Parliament – which the EU is 
then loathe to unpick. Whether the EU can reach such a compromise on what to offer a 
departing Britain will be the focus of a great deal of the negotiations and play a 
significant part in deciding what form of deals Britain can expect. As we discuss below, 
several of the post-withdrawal possibilities on offer could trigger national ratification 
processes, including possible referendums.  
 
EU(UK): Article 50, Brexit transition and new relationship. 
 
Article 50 allows Britain to remain a member state until a withdrawal has been agreed. 
Until then the British government and representatives in the EU (such as MEPs) are 
entitled to partake in all EU business and meetings except those that relate to Britain’s 
withdrawal. This does not mean Britain is banished entirely from the EU’s negotiations 
about a Brexit. It does, however, mean that the EU will have the right to discuss the 
British exit without Britain’s presence. As it did with the 2015-16 UK-EU renegotiation 
of Britain’s membership, the British government will need to put on – and invest the 
necessary resources for – a concerted diplomatic effort to shape the positions of various 
member states and EU institutions (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016). Unlike the 
renegotiation, Britain will not have the right to sit in on all EU level meetings on the 
matter.  
 
How the EU – collectively or as individual member states and EU institutions – 
responds to a Brexit will depend on five Is: Ideas, Interests, Institutions, International 
and Individuals (Oliver, 2015b). The biggest tensions within the EU will be in balancing 
ideas (e.g. protecting political ideas such as ‘ever closer union’) and interests (e.g. limiting 
the economic, social and security costs). Institutional limits such as WTO rules and the 
EU’s own rules limit what the EU can and cannot do to punish Britain or offer it in 
terms of new relationships. International pressures may convince some EU member 
states to seek a quick agreement with a country that still packs a punch internationally. 
What will individual leaders such as Merkel or Hollande be able to offer given they face 
elections in 2017? Some individual leaders will note their state faces little costs from a 
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Brexit, so may seek deals from states that do. Others may view the situation as one that is 
not a zero-sum game, where Britain’s loss of investment or trade is not automatically the 
EU’s gain. Those investments may instead go elsewhere in the world. 
 
The EU will face three problems in reaching agreement. First, as noted above, the 
process set out in article 50 requires the EU to reach agreement on a new deal not only 
with Britain but amongst itself. While the exit deal will be dealt with by the member state 
governments through a European Council vote, the deal over a new relationship could 
require national ratifications through a national and/or regional parliaments, rulings by 
national supreme courts, and in some cases through referendums. The potential 
economic, social and political implications of Brexit vary across the EU (Irwin, 2015; 
Möller and Oliver 2014; BrexitVote blog, 2016). Agreeing to deals over an exit, transition 
or new relationship would be of higher importance for some states than others, creating 
the possibility of some EU member states that are more pro-UK resenting certain other 
states delaying or complicating any agreement.  
 
Second, this raises the broader question of whether the EU can maintain a united front 
in facing a withdrawing UK or if disagreement amongst themselves and lobbying by the 
UK will prevent any EU solidarity. While the UK’s ability to divide and rule should not 
be overplayed, the EU has long struggled to create unity in the face of other powers such 
as the USA, Russia or Israel. In the case of Britain it would face a state with a long record 
of working the corridors of Brussels and national capitals (Smith and Tsatsas, 2002). 
 
There are seven possible new relationships the EU could reach with the UK, each with 
pros and cons for the EU (Piris, 2016). Many have been debated in detail elsewhere and 
so only require a brief reprise here. First, a customised special deal that would see Britain 
opt out of any costly parts of EU membership such as free movement. This could create 
a type of relationship with the EU that is less costly than traditional membership, leading 
to concerns that other member states would try to replicate it. Second, an EEA model 
similar to that of Norway. Such a deal could serve as a transition arrangement, but as 
noted above some leave campaigners would baulk at the sovereignty, budget and 
immigration requirements. Third, Britain could rejoin EFTA, although the EFTA 
agreement is very out-dated. Fourth, the Swiss model (a tailored version of EFTA) with s 
series of bilateral UK-EU agreements. This model has long irritated the EU, with a 
British version likely to be strongly resisted. Fifth, Britain could remain in the EU’s 
customs union, like Turkey, accepting the EU’s external tariffs without having any say 
over them. Sixth, a UK-EU free trade deal lowering tariffs below WTO levels. This could 
extend more to goods than services, with the EU demanding tough concessions 
(potentially involving free movement or budgetary contributions) from Britain for a deal 
over areas such as financial services. Seventh, no agreement would see the UK-EU 
relationship automatically switch to trading under WTO rules. This is widely predicted to 
be an option that would lead to the worst economic costs for both the UK and the EU. 
 
EU-UK: Foreign, Security, and Defence Cooperation 
 
As a major military, diplomatic and economic power, Britain has sought to use the EU to 
boost its own standing while also ensuring the EU itself pursues an agenda aligned with 
Britain’s international priorities. Britain’s standing and clout is much reduced, with Brexit 
itself likely to further this. Nevertheless, foreign, defence and security cooperation 
remain areas where Britain is in a strong position vis-à-vis the rest of the EU and likely to 
seek on-going close links. Britain brings important links – albeit not the only ones – to 
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the USA, NATO, the UN and more. Working through the EU is not without its flaws, 
but other options for Britain to pursue its interests such as by rebuilding the 
Commonwealth, developing the ‘Anglosphere’, joining NAFTA, or becoming a 
‘Switzerland with nukes’, are seen as limited or overplayed. Attempting to work closely 
with partners in the EU (bilaterally or multilaterally) will therefore remain a starting point 
for British foreign policy. It remains unclear whether any relationship can be agreed by 
which Britain will be formally involved in foreign policy decision making, as opposed to 
informal discussions. It may be that events necessitate arrangements, meaning interests 
and international pressures trump any ideas about EU-only cooperation. Other areas of 
cooperation may also open over climate change negotiations and international 
development. One possibility is that the EU engage the UK through forums such as an 
EU+1 arrangement, an EU2+1 involving France, Germany and the UK, or a modified 
version of the EU’s current G6 (von Ondarza, 2013). Objections may, however, be 
raised in Britain where continued involvement with the EU’s CFSP arrangements could 
be seen as Britain giving succour to efforts that some fear will in the longer-term 
undermine NATO. 
 
EU(EU) – Rebalancing the Union 
 
While the EU and Britain are negotiating an exit and new relationship the EU itself will 
be busy negotiating how to change itself internally to reflect Britain’s departure. The 
clearest changes will be over allocation of votes under QMV, national distribution of 
MEPs, changes to the EU’s budget and spending, and staffing changes. These changes 
will be fought over because they will form part of a changing balance of power in the 
Union from changes to the Eurozone and Schengen (Grant 2016a; Oliver, 2016a). There 
exist numerous scenarios over how the EU will be changed. The position of the 
Eurozone could be strengthened to the detriment of non-Eurozone members. There has 
been some speculation that countries such as France and Germany may make a renewed 
push for integration (Posener 2016). However, this has been limited by fear of provoking 
Eurosceptic feelings elsewhere in the EU. The EU could see further differentiated 
integration, but it is not clear where this would take the Union, as it would vary across 
policy areas. That said, Britain’s withdrawal will end Britain’s opt outs, simplifying some 
of the EU’s policies and structures. A final possibility is that Brexit unravels the EU, or is 
the latest signal of a Union headed towards disintegration. Polling suggests that Britain’s 
experiences since the 23 June have (at least initially) pushed up support for European 
integration elsewhere in the EU (FEPS, 2016). Nevertheless, the situation facing the EU 
as Britain withdraws is one of institutional change, shifting priorities and tense political 
relations between publics and elites (Morillas, 2016; Niblett, 2016). If the UK overcomes 
the economic and political challenges of Brexit while the EU and Eurozone struggle, 
then there could be an increase in scepticism towards interstation, potentially beginning a 
process that unravels the EU. European disintegration could happen in a number of 
ways, with the focus being on the response of Germany (Webber, 2014; Vollaard, 2014). 
The Europe that follows any unravelling could be one where the supranational political 
setup of the EU is either maintained amongst a small group of countries centred around 
Germany or a more intergovernmental arrangement re-emerges focused largely on trade. 
So far the EU has tended to muddle through in the face of the challenges that could 
unravel it, coping with rather than solving them (Wright, 2013). Muddling through Brexit 
is a likely way forward given a new relationship will be complex and about more than 
relations with Britain because it will also connect to the changing place of the EU in 
Europe and the world.   
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EU(Europe) – An EU in a multipolar Europe 
 
Brexit will necessitate negotiations between the EU and other non-EU European 
countries and be part of a longer-term change that sees the emergence – or clarification – 
of a multipolar Europe. Should the new UK-EU relationship involve the EEA or EFTA 
then there will be discussions primarily with Norway (EEA) and Switzerland (EFTA) 
about how the new UK-EU deal affects relationships that have become largely tailored 
to their needs. Should Britain secure some new form of relationship then non-EU 
European states may be minded to request changes to their own relationships to replicate 
or cherry-pick from the British deal.  
 
A multipolar Europe will see Turkey and Russia as the other two European poles to that 
of the EU (Krastev and Leonard, 2010) with Brexit adding – or clarifying – another pole 
in Western Europe. While Brexit has reduced Britain’s international standing and 
capacity to affect change internationally, Britain retains a large global economy, London 
is Europe’s most global city and if population projections hold then sometime in the 
2040s Britain’s population could grow similar or larger to that of a declining Germany 
(Eurostat, 2011). This does not mean the poles will be of equal standing. Should the EU 
unite then its relationship with Britain might come to resemble that of the USA’s 
relationship with Britain: a one-sided ‘special relationship’. As noted above, that 
relationship will be important for both if they are to manage common problems such as 
the uncertain futures facing the other two poles of Russia and Turkey. If the EU itself 
cannot overcome the uncertainties overhanging its future then an outcome as outlined by 
Techau (2014) could emerge of a Europe that, ‘is not a pillar of world affairs but a 
territory that risks being pulled asunder between the United States and Asia’. 
 
Close relations with the USA will remain the cornerstone of European and British 
security. Brexit is not going to end, at least in the short term, the close security links that 
are the heart of the UK-US special relationship. Nor does Brexit mean the USA will give 
up on the EU or its long-standing support for European integration (Oliver and 
Williams, 2016). Brexit has, however, forfeited Britain’s right to claim ‘primus inter pares’ 
in the EU when it comes to relations with the USA. Brexit does create opportunities to 
further heighten US exasperation at Europe’s divisions and inability to think about 
geostrategic concerns – whether they be Russia, China or ISIS – and invest in the 
necessary defence commitments. Britain’s decision in the wake of the 23 June vote to 
commit resources (around 650 troops) to the defence of the Baltic states was a move 
intended to assuage fears in the US, EU and NATO of UK isolationism (Riley-Smith, 
2016). These fears were in part based on the UK’s reluctant and limited role in the 2014 
Ukraine crisis. While the move was also intended to generate goodwill, suggestions have 
been made that ministers have made the commitment to secure leverage over Eastern 
European countries for negotiations about the UK’s EU exit and post-withdrawal 
relationship. As Grant (2016) cautioned: ‘if they imply that they are defending Eastern 
Europe in order to engineer a better FTA, rather than because they care about 
democracy and deterring bullying by Russia, they will rapidly lose credibility in the 
region.’ 
 
EU(World) – An EU in a multipolar world 
 
As discussed above, the EU and Britain will not only need to discuss how to cooperate 
with one another on international matters but also negotiate with international partners 
whose views of the EU will be changed by Brexit. Brexit has added to perceptions of the 
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EU as a declining and fragmenting power (David, 2016), perceptions already given 
prominence by problems in the Eurozone, Schengen and with Russia. The rest of the 
world will know from these other problems that the EU is likely to spend a period of 
time naval gazing as it comes to terms with the fallout from Brexit. An immediate 
concern, especially for the USA, will be the future of TTIP. TTIP’s future was uncertain 
before the 23 June vote because of public opposition across the EU (Novotná, 2016). 
Representatives of both the USA and the EU have made clear TTIP could take place 
without Britain. However, the loss of such a large economy and one with extensive links 
with the USA could be the fatal blow to negotiations. If TTIP survives then a negotiation 
can be expected at some point as to Britain’s part in the agreement, or later inclusion 
along with countries such as Canada. Failure of TTIP would end hopes for some 
economic relationship to balance NATO in the transatlantic relationship, and thus a 
powerful geoeconomic tool for both sides in the face of emerging economic powers 
(Kupchan, 2014). 
 
The collapse of TTIP could also add to concerns that the transatlantic allies will find it 
increasingly difficult to agree approaches to emerging powers, especially when this 
touches on security challenges connected to China. Europe’s inability to think 
geostrategically about emerging powers (de France and Witney, 2013) has long 
concerned Washington D.C. The UK’s own behaviour has caused alarm in the USA, for 
example the British government’s decision in 2015 to join the Asian Investment and 
Infrastructure Bank, an institution viewed in the USA with suspicion as a harbinger of a 
wider challenge to the existing US-European institutional order (Hemming, 2016). A 
Britain trying to find its way outside the EU may seek closer relations with emerging 
powers, pursuing a mercantilist foreign policy that puts it at odds with US security 
concerns. US concerns about possible British positions could become similar to those 
about Germany, a country with Europe’s largest trading links with markets such as 
China. Brexit could strengthen Germany’s dominant position, reinforcing at an EU level 
Germany’s preference for geoeconomic thinking over the geopolitical (Kundanani, 
2011). 
 
EU(Business) – business as usual? 
 
While Brexit unfolds (at least until the end of the article 50 process, and potentially as 
part of some transition arrangement) Britain will be excluded from discussions and 
decisions relating to its withdrawal, but remain a member of the EU and able to vote and 
conduct business on all other matters as any member state is entitled. There will be some 
unease within the EU as to whether Britain should vote or make decisions on matters 
that will shape the EU’s policies post-UK exit. There may be some pressure for Britain 
to withdraw from such discussions. Some in Britain have called for the British 
government to use its remaining powers to disrupt EU business as a way of leveraging a 
good exit deal for Britain (Nixon, 2016).  
 
Riding out Brexit 
 
The numerous overlapping negotiations, multiple actors and various options for going 
forward can be reduced to two outcomes: Brexit could unfold as a ‘soft Brexit’ or a 
‘harsh Brexit’ (Morillas, 2016). The key difference between the two lies in the levels of 
trust shown between all involved. A harsh Brexit would see Brexit defined by a collapse 
in trust between Britain and the EU, an uncertain political situation within Britain, and 
heightened tensions within the remaining EU that risks European disintegration. This 
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would come about through difficulties within the remaining EU at reaching a withdrawal 
deal with Britain that would balance the economic costs (especially as felt by some 
member states compared to others) with protecting integration; Britain’s own internal 
political and constitutional difficulties; strained personal relations between leading 
politicians and decision makers in Britain and the EU; and the alignment of Brexit with 
another crisis such as a Grexit or collapse of Schengen that ends the EU’s existing 
approach of muddling through such crises.  
 
The implications of a harsh Brexit would be severe, with Britain seeing any initial 
economic shock from the leave vote turned into a longer-running economic challenge. 
The EU would also feel an economic shock, with both sides feeling the social shocks 
thanks to the knock-on implications for British citizens living elsewhere in the EU and 
EU citizens resident in Britain. Geopolitically such a scenario would see strained 
transatlantic relations and, in perhaps the most radical outcome, some reordering of 
European geopolitics whether in the form of a fragmented Britain and/or of the EU and 
the emergence of a replacement system for managing pan-European politics. Central to 
such a development would be a ‘crisis made in Germany’, where Berlin loses faith in the 
current EU project as a result of a widespread break-down in EU solidarity and the 
increasing costs Germany is asked to carry to try to maintain EU unity (Webber, 2014). 
 
This does not mean a soft Brexit – where more harmonious relations prevail – is the only 
hope. It is possible to sketch out a positive outcome from the above negotiations leading 
to a harsh Brexit. It could be that having experienced the pain of a harsh Brexit, Britain 
and the EU eventually – perhaps after a decade – find a more settled relationship with 
positive outcomes for their economics, politics and security. The EU has a long history 
of integrating through facing crises, and a Brexit could therefore drive forward 
integration. Rid of an often awkward partner, the EU could find it integrates further in 
the face of having to face the costs of a Brexit at the same time as facing a Grexit or 
other crisis. Instead of muddling through in the face of repeated crises, the EU could 
find it negotiates a new treaty that brings a degree of enhanced unity that creates a more 




Barnett, A. (2016) It’s England’s Brexit. OpenDemocracy, 4 June 2016, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/anthony-barnett/it-s-england-s-brexit accessed 30 
July 2016.  
 
Barrett, A., Bergin, A., FitzGerald, J., Lambert, D., McCoy, D., Morgenroth, E., 
Siedschlag, I. and Studnicka, Z. (2015) Scoping the possible Economic Implications of 
Brexit on Ireland. Dublin: ESRI Research Series: The Economic and Social Research 
Institute, https://www.esri.ie/pubs/RS48.pdf accessed 30 July 2016. 
 
BBC News (2016) Brexit: PM is ‘willing to listen to options’ on Scotland. BBC News, 15 
July. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36800536 accessed 30 
July 2016. 
 
Boffey, D. and Helm, T. (2016) Pro-EU Labour and Tory MPs look at forming new 
centrist party. The Guardian, 9 July, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/09/labour-tory-mps-talk accessed 30 
July 2016.  
 12 
 
Beauchamp, Z (2016) Brexit isn’t about economics. It’s about xenophobia. Vox World, 
24 June. http://www.vox.com/2016/6/23/12005814/brexit-eu-referendum-immigrants 
accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
BrexitVote blog (2016) European views on the Brexit negotiations. London: LSE 
BrexitVote blog, 25 July, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexitvote/2016/07/25/european-
views-on-the-brexit-negotiations/ accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Chalmers, D. and Menon, A. (2016) Getting out quick and playing the long game. 
London: Open Europe Briefing 07/2016, 
http://openeurope.org.uk/intelligence/britain-and-the-eu/3-step-brexit-solution/ 
accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Cooper, C. (2016) EU referendum: MPs may push to keep UK in European single 
market despite Brexit vote. The Independent, 6 June.  
 
David, J. (2016) Brexit wound: UK vote makes EU decline ‘practically irreversible’, Soros 
says. CNBCS, 26 June, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/25/brexit-makes-eus-
dissolution-practically-inevitable-george-soros.html accessed 30 July 2016. 
 
de France, O. and Witney, N. (2013) Europe’s Strategic Cacophony. London: ECFR 
Policy Brief, April, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR77_SECURITY_BRIEF_AW.pdf 
accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Dhingra, S., Ottaviano, G., Sampson, T., and Van Reenen, J. (2016) The consequences of 
Brexit for UK trade and living standards. London: LSE Centre for Economic 
Performance, CEP Brexit Analysis No. 2, 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit02.pdf accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Dorman, A. (2014) More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications 
of Scottish independence. International Affairs, 90(3): 679–696. 
 
Douglas-Scot, S. (2014) British withdrawal from the EU: an existential threat to the 
United Kingdom? London: Centre on Constitutional Change, 24 October, 
http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/british-withdrawal-eu-existential-
threat-united-kingdom accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Eurostat (2011) Population projections 2010-2060. Brussels: Eurostat, 8 June, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-11-80_en.htm accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
FEPS (2016) Europeans and Brexit. Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive 
Studies, 18 July. http://www.feps-europe.eu/en/publications/details/412 accessed 30 
July 2016. 
 
Foreign Affairs Committee (2016) Equipping the Government for Brexit. London: 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report, HC 431, 20 July, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/431/431.pdf 
accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
 13 
Fordham, T. and Techau, J. (2016) Global Political Risk: the new convergence between 
geopolitical and vox populi risks, and why it matters. Citi GPS, January 2016,  
 
Glencross, A. (2015) Why a British referendum on EU membership will not solve the 
European question. International Affairs 91(2): 303-317. 
 
Goodwin, M. (2015) UKIP: Inside the campaign to redraw the map of British politics. 
Oxford: OUP. 
 
Goodwin, M. (2016) Brexit: Identity trumps economics in revolt against elites. FT, 24 
June.  
 
Gower, P. (2016) Brexit Article 50 challenge to quickly move to Supreme Court. 
Bloomberg, 19 July, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-19/court-
takes-brexit-challenge-very-seriously-judge-leveson-says accessed on 30 July 2016.  
 
Grant, C. (2016a) How Brexit is changing the EU’ CER, Bulletin Article, 15 July 2016, 
http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2016/how-brexit-
changing-eu accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Grant, C. (2016b) Theresa May and her six pack of difficult deals. London: CER, insight, 
28 July, https://www.cer.org.uk/insights/theresa-may-and-her-six-pack-difficult-deals 
accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Hemming, J. (2016) US Views: selective and ambivalent thinking. In Oliver, T. (ed.) New 
Challenges, new voices: next generation viewpoints on transatlantic relations. London: 
LSE IDEAS Special Report 22. pp. 62-69, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/New-Challenges,-New-
Voices.pdf accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Home Affairs Committee (2016) The work of the Immigration Directorates (Q1 2016). 
London: House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Sixth Report, HC 151, 27 July, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/151/151.pdf 
accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Irwin, G. (2015) Brexit: the impact on the UK and the EU. London: Global Counsel, 
http://www.global-
counsel.co.uk/system/files/publications/Global_Counsel_Impact_of_Brexit_June_2015
.pdf accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Krastev, I. and Leonard, M. (2010) The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe. London: ECFR, 
October, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR25_SECURITY_UPDATE_AW_SINGLE.pdf accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Kundanani, H. (2011) Germany as a Geo-Economic Power. Washington Quarterly 34(3): 
31-45. 
 
Kupchan, C. (2014) The Geopolitical Implications of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership. Washington D.C.: Transatlantic Academy, Analysis, June. 
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Kupchan_TTIPs
GeopoliticalImplications_Jun14.pdf accessed 30 July 2016.  
 14 
 
Mayor of London (2016) Sadiq Khan: London needs stronger voice and new powers to 
boost growth. Mayor of London press release, 26 July, 
https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/london-needs-stronger-voice-and-
new-powers accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
McGough, L. and Piazza, G. (2016) 10 years of tax: how cities contribute to the national 
exchequer. London: Centre for Cities, 7 July, http://www.centreforcities.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/16-07-05-10-Years-of-Tax-1.pdf accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Miller, V. (2016) EU referendum: the process of leaving the EU. London: House of 
Commons Library briefing paper, No. 7551, 8 April, 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-
7551#fullreport accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Möller, A. and Oliver, T. (eds.) (2014), The United Kingdom and the European Union: 
What would a "Brexit" mean for the EU and other States around the World? Berlin: 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik e.V., No 16, 
https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/25763 accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Morillas, P. (2016) The Brexit Scenarios: towards a new UK-EU relationship, CIDOB, 
June, 
http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/documents_cidob_new_era/
the_brexit_scenarios_towards_a_new_uk_eu_relationship accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Niblett, R. (2016) Mutual misunderstandings risk compounding the UK-EU split. 
London: Chatham House, 8 July. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/mutual-misunderstandings-risk-
compounding-uk-eu-split accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Nixon, S. (2016) Bracing for the turmoil of a potential Brexit. The Wall Street Journal, 12 
June, http://www.wsj.com/articles/bracing-for-the-turmoil-of-a-potential-brexit-
1465755351 accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
North, R. (ed.) Flexcit: A plan for leaving the European Union. Leave Alliance, 
http://www.eureferendum.com/documents/flexcit.pdf accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Novotná, T. (2016) European View: Four Reasons Why TTIP May Fail and Why It Will 
be Europe’s Fault. In Oliver, T. (ed.) New Challenges, new voices: next generation 
viewpoints on transatlantic relations. London: LSE IDEAS Special Report 22. pp. 62-69, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/New-Challenges,-New-
Voices.pdf accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Oliver, T. (2014) Londoners are not Little Englanders. LSE British Politics and Policy 
blog, 17 March 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/londoners-are-not-little-
englanders/ accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Oliver, T. (2015a) To be or not to be in Europe: is that the question? Britain’s European 
question and an in/out referendum. International Affairs 91(1): 77-91. 
 
 15 
Oliver, T. (2015b) How the EU responds to a British withdrawal will be determined by 5 
key factors. LSE BrexitVote blog, 3 December, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexitvote/2015/12/03/europes-potential-responses-to-a-british-
withdrawal-from-the-union-will-be-determined-by-ideas-interests-institutions-the-
international-and-individuals/ accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Oliver, T. (2016a) A European Union without the UK: the geopolitics of a British exit 
from the EU. London, UK: LSE IDEAS Strategic Update no. 16.1.  
 
Oliver, T. (2016a) Why the EU referendum will not be the end of the story. London, 
UK: Federal Trust, February, http://fedtrust.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Why_the_EU_Referendum_will_not_be_the_end_of_the_st
ory.pdf accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Oliver, T. (2016b) Shades of Grey: is Brexit going to lead to European disintegration? 
LSE BrexitVote blog, 1 July. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexitvote/2015/12/03/europes-
potential-responses-to-a-british-withdrawal-from-the-union-will-be-determined-by-ideas-
interests-institutions-the-international-and-individuals/ accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Oliver, T. and Williams, M.J. (2016) Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of 
the US-EU and US-UK relationships. International Affairs 92(3): 547-567. 
 
von Ondarza, N. (2013) Strengthening the Core or Splitting Europe? Prospects and 
Pitfalls of a Strategy of Differentiated Integration. Berlin: SWP Research Paper, RP 2.  
 
Peterkin, T. (2016) Nicola Sturgeon set for Brussels talks with Martin Schulz. The 
Scotsman, 28 June, http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/nicola-sturgeon-set-for-
brussels-talks-with-martin-schulz-1-4164272 accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Piris, J. (2016) If the UK votes to leave: the seven alternatives to EU membership. 
Centre for European Reform, 12 January, 
http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2016/if-uk-votes-leave-seven-
alternatives-eu-membership accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Posener, A. (2016) Germans need to get real on Brexit. Carnegie Europe, 16 June, 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63826 accessed on 30 July 2016.  
 
Portland (2016) Soft Power 30 – a ranking of global soft power. London: Portland 
Communications, http://softpower30.portland-communications.com/ranking/ accessed 
30 July 2016.  
 
Rankin, J. (2016) Liberal Democrats will fight election on halting Brexit, says Farron. The 
Guardian, 28 June, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/28/liberal-
democrats-fight-election-halting-brexit-tim-farron accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Renwick, A. (2016) Does the Prime Minister have to trigger Brexit talks under Article 50 
after a vote to leave the EU? The UCL Constitution Unit blog, 23 February, 
https://constitution-unit.com/2016/02/23/does-the-prime-minister-have-to-invoke-
article-50-if-we-vote-for-brexit/ accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
 16 
Riley-Smith, B. (2016) Britain commits 650 troops to Nato’s Baltic forces to counter 
Vladimir Putin. The Telegraph, 8 July, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/07/britain-commits-650-troops-to-natos-
baltic-forces-deterring-puti/ accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Ruparel, R. (2016) Priorities for the new Department for International Trade post-Brexit. 
London: Open Europe, 27 July, http://openeurope.org.uk/today/blog/priorities-for-
the-new-department-for-international-trade-post-brexit/ accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Shipman, T. and Pancevski, B. (2016) Tories warn May over Brexit lite. The Times, 24 
July http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tories-warn-may-of-revolt-over-brexit-lite-
d2r0b7lrc accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Smith, J. and Tsatsas, M. (2002) The New Bilateralism: the UK’s relations with the EU. 
London: Chatham House. 
 
Stephens, P. (2016) Britain is starting to imitate Greece. FT, 30 June, 
https://next.ft.com/content/45b51582-3de3-11e6-9f2c-36b487ebd80a accessed 30 July 
2016.  
 
Strong, J. (2016) The Brexit debate is far from over: there will have to be a further vote. 
LSE BrexitVote blog, 24 June, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexitvote/2016/06/24/the-
brexit-debate-is-far-from-over-there-will-have-to-be-a-further-vote/ accessed on 30 July 
2016.  
 
Techau, J. (2014) Europe torn apart in the Asian century? Carnegie Europe, 1 July, 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=56054 accessed 30 July 2016.  
 
Uberoi, E. (2016) European Union Referendum 2016. London: House of Commons, 
briefing paper, CBP 7639, 29 June.  
 
Vollaard, H. (2014) Explaining European Disintegration. Journal of Common Market 
Studies 52(5): 1142-1159 
 
Webber, D. (2014) How likely is it that the European Union will disintegrate? A critical 
analysis of competing theoretical perspectives. European Journal of International 
Relations 20(2): 341–65 
 
Wright, T. (2013) Europe’s Lost Decade. Survival 55(6): 7-28.  
 
 
Word count: 8131  
 17 
Choose Your Own Brexit Adventure 
 
Abstract:  The decision by a majority of the British people to leave the European 
Union was in turn shocking insofar as few experts saw the leave camp 
winning, unprecedented insofar as no country has ever left the EU, not to 
mention hitting global business confidence with warnings of worse to 
come. Viewed after the event as being a revolt against  globalization, a 
rejection of austerity, or simply a nativist rejection of all things foreign, 
there is little doubt that the consequences of the vote will be long-lasting 
for the UK in particular and the rest of the world. As this article shows, 
the decision itself, and the determination by the new British government 
to makes sure Brexit really does mean Brexit, leaves nearly every question 
unanswered. It is of course perfectly reasonable to think of what has 
happened – and might happen in the future – as  ‘events’. But it is clear 
that Brexit will be less an event and more a process in which all manner 
of outcomes are possible. The process will unfold through multiple 
overlapping negotiations, which will take place at various levels of policy 
making and involve numerous political actors. The process holds plenty 
of opportunities for a breakdown in relations in UK politics, between the 
UK and the EU and in European geopolitics with international 
implications. Brexit need not turn out badly, but there will be many 
opportunities for it to do so. This article maps out the thirteen 
negotiations that will now take place, identifying the key actors and issues 
each will cover. 
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